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Article 2

Is Monopoly Rent Seeking Compatible with
Wealth Maximization?
Mark Glick*
This article questions whether the wealth-mimizing
effcciency criterion adopted by the law-and-economics movement
is compatible with the implicit theory of social costs contained
in theories of rent-seeking behavior. My argument is simple:
under the wealth-maximizing efficiency criterion, all voluntary
market transactions yield welfare gains. Since many types of
rent-seeking activities involve purely voluntary market
transactions, such market activities must also necessarily lead
t o wealth gains and not to social costs, as the rent-seeking
literature asserts.' The theory of rent-seeking activities
transforms welfare gains into costs only by introducing
arbitrary value judgments into the economic and legal analysis.
If my claim is true, it has important implications for the debate
concerning the social costs of monopoly. As the participants in
that debate recognize, if market based rent-seeking activities
do not constitute social costs, then the estimated social costs
from monopoly are small, possibly calling into question the
need for expensive antitrust enf~rcement.~Moreover, as
explained below, without rent-seeking costs from monopoly,
there is little defense to claims of the indeterminacy of

* Associate Professor of Economics, Adjunct Professor of Law, University of
Utah; J.D. 1990, Columbia; Ph.D. 1985, New School for Social Research; M.A. 1980,
B.A. 1976, U.C.L.A. The author acknowledges helpful discussions and suggestions
from Robert Lande, Lance Girton, John Flynn, E.K. Hunt and Donald Campbell.
1. See, e.g. Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Policy and the Social Cost of
L. REV. 371 (1993); Herbert Hovenkamp,,Antitrust's Protected
Monopoly, 78 IOWA
Classes, 88 MICH. L. REV. 1, 12-20 (1989); Richard S. Markovits, Second-Best
Theory and the Standard Analysis of Monopoly Rent Seeking: A Generalizable
Critique, a "Sociological" Account, and Some Illustrative Stories, 78 IOWAL. REV.
327 (1993); William H. Page, Optimal Antitrust Penalties and Competitors' Injury,
88 MICH. L. REV. 2151 (1990); Richard A. Posner, The Social Costs of Monopoly
and Regulation, 83 J. POL. ECON.807 (1975).
2. See supra note 1.
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antitrust enforcement outcomes based on the economic theory
of "second bestaH3

I. RENTSEEKINGAND THE SOCIALCOSTSOF MONOPOLY
The usual method of measuring the social costs of
monopoly is illustrated by the partial equilibrium economic
model of monopoly with constant marginal and average costs.*

DIAGRAM 1

In Diagram 1 above, the triangle WL1 measures the
deadweight loss to monopoly. The deadweight loss represents
consumers who would have purchased the product a t issue at
the competitive price, PC, but then substituted to other
products once prices rose to Pm as a result of the imposition of
monopoly. The quantity of the monopolist's lost sales because of
the higher price is equal to Qc-Qm, and the resulting lost
consumer surplus as a result of the consumer substitutions is
WLL5
The rectangle WL2 should not be thought of as a
deadweight loss, but rather as a measure of income transfer
from those individuals who do not substitute away when the

3. See infia note 21 and accompanying text.
4. See, e.g., PAUL
A. SAMUELSON
& WILLIAMD. NORDHAUS,
MICROECONOMICS
E. STIGLITZ,PRINCIPLES
OF MICROECONOMICS
450
190-91 (14th ed. 1992); JOSEPH
(1993).
5. The consumer surplus for a unit of output is the difference between the
consumer's reservation price, or amount she is willing to pay, and the price she is
required to pay. I discuss consumer surplus in more detail below. Note here that
WL1 is an overstatement of the consumer surplus lost to the society, because it
does not take account of the additional consumer surplus gained by the consumer
in the substitute market.
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price increases from PC to Pm. Since these consumers continue
to purchase the product a t the higher price, all that occurs is a
transfer of income from the consumers to the monopolist in the
amount of WL2. Moreover, from a social point of view, society
as a whole is neither richer nor poorer as a result of this
transfer. All that has transpired is a redistribution of income
between individuals. Rent-seeking theory seeks to transform
this income transfer into a cost.
Rent seeking is usually defined as the political activity of
persons or groups seeking monopoly rights or privileges
. ~ privileges include subsidies,
granted by the g ~ v e r n m e n t Such
tax breaks, price supports, tariffs, import quotas and other
entitlemenk7 Usually, these activities are said to pose two
types of social costs. First, the privileges themselves represent
a deadweight loss to consumers. Second, the expenditure of
resources on their pursuit arguably represents a rent-seeking
social cost because of the more productive alternative uses for
such resource^.^ In antitrust literature, many have contended
that the rectangle WL2 reflects just such a social rent-seeking
cost.g Originally formulated by Gordon Tullock, the rentseeking theory applied here posits that firms will expend real
resources in the search for monopoly profits-for example, by
hiring lawyers and lobbyists.1° If firms are profit maximizing,
the amount of resources expected to be used in the rent-seeking
process will be equal to the expected profits from monopoly, or
the rectangle WL2. For example, suppose that five firms are
competing for monopoly profits in the amount of $500 (i.e.,
WL2 = $500). If each competitor believes that it has a n equal
probability of obtaining the monopoly, each firm will be willing
to invest up to $100 in the process of obtaining market
power." Thus, as a direct result of the monopoly, society will

6. See Robert D. Tollison, Rent Seeking: A Survey, 35 KYKLOS575, 587
(1982).
7. William C. Mitchell & Michael C. Munger, Economic Models of Interest
Groups: An Introductory Survey, 35 A.M. J. POL. SCI. 512, 525 (1991).
8. Tollison, supra note 6, a t 576.
9. See Gordon Tullock, The Welfare Costs of Tariffs, Monopolies and Theft, 5
W. ECON.J. 224 (1967); Tollison, supra note 6, at 581.
10. See also Tollison, supra note 6, at 576 ("[Ilf the process by which
monopoly rents are contrived is subject to competition (e.g., lobbying), the
analytical fiction of these rents as a pure transfer vanishes because resources spent
i n the pursuit of a transfer are wasted from society's point of view.") (emphasis
omitted).
11. See infra note 54 (discussing the fact that the expenditures can exceed
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waste resources in the amount of WL2, making the total social
costs due to monopoly equal to WL1 + WL2.12 As discussed
below, the crucial difference here is that no government action
is sought. The rent-seeking activities occur entirely within the
private sector on the basis of purely market activities.
This rent-seeking argument is important because it solves
two critical problems faced by advocates of vigorous antitrust
enforcement. The first problem is that when WL2 is not treated
as a cost, the total social costs due to monopoly are very small.
For many years economists have been aware that, with certain
simplifying assumptions, the consumer welfare loss from
monopoly, WLI, is empirically mea~urable.'~
From Diagram 1
i t is evident that (assuming a linear demand curve) the
deadweight loss WL1 is equal to one-half the product (PmPc)(Qc-Qm). This quantity can be shown to be a function of the
elasticity of demand and the square of the percentage price
increase resulting from monopoly. Arnold Harberger was the
first to seize upon the measurement possibilities.14 He used
profit rate differentials to proxy the price distortion and
assumed that elasticity was unitary for the years 1924-1928.
He found that the social welfare loss from monopoly is less
than one-tenth of one percent of Gross National Product (GNP),
or about (in 1954) $2 per person in the United S t a t e d 5
Harberger's article fostered a flurry of criticism and
recalculation.16 Most confirmed Harberger's small estimate of
the deadweight loss.17 Others came up with larger estimates,
the expected profits).
12. See Anne 0. Krueger, The Political Economy of the Rent-Seeking Society,
64 AM. ECON.REV. 291, 295-301 (1974); Tullock, supra note 9.
13. See, e.g., Arnold C. Harberger, Monopoly and Resource Allocation, 44 AM.
ECON.REV. 77 (1954).
14. Tollison, supra note 6, at 579.
15. See Harberger, supra note 13, at 84.
EFFICIENCY
48
16. See, e.g., CHARLESK. ROWLEY,ANTITRUSTAND ECONOMIC
(1973); DEAN A. WORCESTER,
JR., MONOPOLY,
BIG BUSINESS,AND WELFAREIN THE
POSTWARUNITED STATES2 10-27 (1967); Abrarn Bergson, On Monopoly Welfare
Losses, 63 AM. ECON.REV. 853 (1973); J.A. Kay, A General Equilibrium Approach
to the Measurement of Monopoly Welfare Loss, 1 INT'L J . INDUS.ORG. 317 (1983);
George J. Stigler, The Statistics of Monopoly and Merger, 64 J. POL. ECON. 33
(1956); Bjorn Wahlroos, Monopoly Welfare Losses Under Uncertainty, 5 1 S. ECON.J.
429 (1984); G.K. Yarrow, Welfare Losses in Oligopoly and Monopolistic Competition,
33 J. INDUS. ECON.515 (1985).
17. See, e.g., David Schwartzman, The Burden of Monopoly, 68 J. POL. ECON.
627 (1960); John J. Siegfried & Thomas K. Tiemann, The Welfare Cost of
Monopoly: An Inter-Industry Analysis, 12 ECON.INQUIRY190, 190 (1974); Dean A.
Worcester, Jr., New Estimates of the Welfare Loss to Monopoly, U.S.: 1956-1969, 40
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some as high as 7% of GNP.18 My own work indicates that
because short-run profit rate differentials primarily capture
disequilibrium effects rather than monopoly, most measures
overestimate the deadweight loss attributed to mon~poly.'~
The consensus among economists is well-summarized by
Sherer:
I t i s hard to think of realistic circumstances under which the
dead-weight loss triangle [WLl] would be very large, for i t
involves the square of the relative price distortion ratio [(PmPc)/Pc], whose average value was only 0.036 in the Harberger
sample and 0.084 in seven industries with high barriers to
entry analyzed by David Q u a l l ~ . ~ '

Because WL1 is typically judged to be relatively small,
maybe the costs of antitrust enforcement outweigh their
benefits. This is especially problematic since the low Harberger
figures were obtained for the middle 1920s-a period of less
than rigorous antitrust enforcement.'' The rent-seeking
conversion of the quantity WL2 into an additional cost of
monopoly thus critically helps justify massive government
expenditures on antitrust enforcement.
A second reason why the rent-seeking argument is
important is that it provides a sensible reply to claims that
antitrust enforcement actually has a detrimental impact on
consumer welfare as a result of second-best problems. As
Posner observes, "[Olnce [WL2] is recognized as being relevant
to the costs of monopoly, a n objection to the economic analysis
of monopoly based on the theory of the 'second best'
disappear^."'^ Second-best problems arise when a substitute
for a monopolized product is not sold a t the competitive price.

S. ECON.J. 234 (1973).
18. Keith Cowling & Dennis C. Mueller, The Social Costs of Monopoly Power,
88 ECON. J. 727, 745 (1978); see also Fr6d6ric Jenny & Andr6-Paul Weber,
Aggregate Welfare Loss Due to Monopoly Power in the French Economy, 32 J.
INDUS. ECON. 113, 128 (1983); Dennis 0. Olson & Donald L. Bumpass, An
Intertemporal Analysis of the Welfare Cost of Monopoly Power, 1 REV. INDUS.ORG.
308, 313-14 (1984).
19. Mark A. Glick & Hans Ehrbar, Long-Run Equilibrium in the Empirical
Study of Monopoly and Competition, 28 ECON.INQUIRY151 (1990).
20. F.M. SHERER & DAVID ROSS, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTUREAND
ECONOMIC
PERFORMANCE
667 (3d ed. 1990) (footnote omitted).
21. See RICHARDA. POSNER,ANTITRUST LAW: AN ECONOMICPERSPECTIVE
25
(1976).
22. Id. a t 13.
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Suppose, for example, that the Department of Justice is
considering a merger in the butter industry that would raise
butter prices by 5%. However, two years previous a cartel had
formed in the margarine industry causing margarine prices to
rise 5%. As a result of the rise in margarine prices, some
consumers switched to butter (resulting in deadweight loss).
Because of the pre-existing price distortion in a close
substitute, the merger between butter firms, even though it
will raise butter prices, will also reduce the deadweight loss by
causing butter and margarine prices to conform more closely to
the original competitive price proportions. When account is
taken of second-best issues, the butter monopoly could result in
increased inefficiency. However, if the change i n income
distribution is considered a cost because of expected rentseeking behavior, enforcement action in butter can be justified
as reducing the rent-seeking cost, independent of any secondbest problems. Thus, the rent-seeking conversion of distribution
into a social cost eliminates a major source of uncertainty
concerning the impact of antitrust enforcement. It is therefore
important to consider whether the rent-seeking arguments
have sound foundation^.^^

When economists discuss efficiency, they generally mean
Pareto optimality. A transaction is Pareto-improving if it can
enhance the welfare of a t least one individual without making
anyone else worse off. Pareto-optimal distributions are states of
affairs in which no further Pareto improvements can be made.
It follows that for a transaction to be Pareto-improving there
must be unanimous consent by all affected. Put differently, the
requirement that no one is harmed provides every potentially
affected individual with veto power over every transaction. It is
generally recognized that this property of the Pareto criterion
imposes severe limitations on its applicability." As a result,
23. The characterization of WL2 as income distribution or as a cost does not
impact the optimal sanction for antitrust violations. The optimal antitrust fine will
equal the total net harm to others. In the monopoly context, this will be equal to
WL1 + WL2. WL2 is a net harm to consumers whether it is characterized a s a
distribution loss to consumers or a social cost resulting from rent seeking. See
Robert H. Lande, Are Antitrust "Treble"Damages Really Single Damages?, 54 OHIO
ST. L.J. 115, 125-26 (1993); William M. Landes, Optimal Sanctions for Antitrust
Violations, 50 U . CHI.L. REV. 652, 653-61 (1983).
24. See Richard A. Posner, The Ethical and Political Basis of the Efficiency
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the law-and-economics approach has adopted an alternative
criterion, called wealth maximization, or the Kaldor-Hicks
compensation principle.25 Although economists rarely openly
admit using any criterion other than Pareto optimality to
explain efficiency, the contrary is evident from a reading of any
economics textbook o r observing the actual application of the
efficiency concept. According to Posner,
Because the conditions for Pareto superiority are almost
never satisfied in the real world, yet economists talk quite a
bit about efficiency, it is pretty clear that the operating
definition of efficiency in economics is not Pareto superiority.
When an economist says that free trade or competition or the
control of pollution or some other policy or state of the world
is efficient, nine times out of ten he means Kaldor-Hicks
efficient.26

As opposed to the Pareto criterion, a transaction is
Kaldor-Hicks efficient, or wealth maximizing, if the individuals
that benefit from a transaction experience a benefit that
exceeds anyone else's loss, such that they can still retain a net
gain after potentially compensating any individuals that
experience diminished welfare.27 Obviously, a c t u a l
compensation is not required, or else the wealth maximization
principle would be transformed back into the Pareto criterion.
The intuition behind wealth maximization is that efficiency
can be conceived of as the maximizing of the social "pie," while
distribution of the parts of the pie can be considered as a
separate issue.28 The pie is not the total set of goods and
services in the economy. Rather, the substance of the pie is
"utilityy7backed by purchasing power; or, put differently, the
pie consists of utility revealed by willingness to pay. The subtle
lapse into considering wealth a s physical goods and services
seems to be almost irresistible in the law-and-economics
literature, yet it is clearly not consistent with economic theory.

Norm in Common Law Adjudication, 8 HOFSTRAL. REV.487, 489 (1980) ("Paretosuperiority criterion is useless for most policy questions").
25. See J.R. Hicks, The Foundations of Welfare Economics, 49 ECON.
J. 696
(1939); Nicholas Kaldor, Welfare Propositions of Economics a n d Interpersonal
J. 549 (1939).
Comparisons of Utility, 49 ECON.
ECONOMIC
ANALYSISOF LAW 14 (4th ed. 1992).
26. RICHARDA. POSNER,
27. Posner, supra note 24, at 491.
28. For a criticism of the consistency of this view of efficiency, see Victor P.
Goldberg, On Positive Theories of Redistribution, 11 J. ECON.
ISSUES
119 (1977).
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A simple example can illustrate the distinction. Suppose good
W is bartered from Individual A to Individual B. Assuming B
values the item higher than A, putting W in the hands of B
increases social wealth, even though our measure of GNP
remains constant. Posner is therefore correct when he proposes
the following example:
Before the transaction you had a bag of oranges worth less
than $5 to you and I had $5; after the transaction you have
$5 and I have a bag of oranges worth more than $5 to me. We
are both richer, as measured by the money value we attach to
the goods in question.29

An absolutely critical corollary of the wealth-maximizing
efficiency criterion is that voluntary trade between individuals
results in welfare gains to both parties to the t r a n s a c t i ~ n . ~ ~
This proposition forms the basis of the most fundamental
prescriptions of law and economic^.^^ As a result of gains to
trade, it is universally argued that entitlements should be
protected by property rights when transaction costs are low.32
Property rights force others who wish to obtain an entitlement
to buy it from its holder in a voluntary transaction in the
market. Such private property rules are only efficient because
(according to the wealth maximization criterion) voluntary
transactions are expected to yield wealth gains to both
individuals. If one of the individuals to the transaction were a
potential loser he or she would simply refuse to undertake the
transaction. If this were not true the case for private property
rights would not follow.33 In contrast, liability rules, such as
negligence, are only necessary when transaction costs make

29. Richard A. Posner, Utilitarianism, Economics, and Legal Theory, 8 J.
LEGALSTUD.103, 120 (1979).
30. One difficult issue is defining the boundary between voluntary
transactions and duress. See MAKK KELMAN,A GUIDETO CRITICALLEGALSTUDIES
ch. 3 (1987); Robert L. Hale, Bargaining, Duress, and Economic Liberty, 43 COLUM.
L. REV.603 (1943).
31. See, eg., DAVIDW. BARNES& LYNNA. STOUT,CASESAND TR ATE RIALS ON
LAWAND ECONOMICS
180 (1992) ("If two parties contract voluntarily and with full
information, both must expect the contracted-for exchange to improve their
welfare. . . . Only when voluntary cooperation breaks down does the law intervene.").
32. POSNER,supra note 26, at 15.
33. The reason is that property rights force individuals to transact voluntarily
i n the marketplace. The case fm private property dissolves if it cannot be assumed
that voluntary market transactions are efficiency-improving.
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voluntary market transactions i n f e a ~ i b l e .This
~ ~ explains, for
example, why negligence rules are necessary in the tort area. A
tort involves strangers in a situation unlikely to be amenable
to negotiation and private contract.35 The economic
explanation of liability rules also assumes that if individuals
could successfully privately negotiate, then social gains would
result.

It is universally argued that monopoly is inefficient. Many
argue further that the goals of the antitrust laws should solely
But in what sense is monopoly
be to increase effi~iency.~~
inefficient and competition efficient? Only two possible answers
exist: Either competition is Pareto-improving, or it is wealthmaximizing. The first possibility cannot explain why monopoly
is inefficient. It is obvious that a movement from monopoly to
competition is not Pareto-improving. Under the Pareto
criterion, an efficient change is one in which some gain but
none lose, yet a transition from monopoly to competition harms
. ~ ~
the monopolist in the form of lost profits, or W L ~Therefore,
eliminating monopoly cannot be Pareto-improving. In fact, it is
possible to have Pareto-optimal distributions with or without
monopoly.38
Accordingly, the only possible ground on which it can be
claimed that competition is more efficient than monopoly is
wealth maximization. The argument is evident. When
competition is restored in Diagram 1,consumers gain WL2 and
WL1, but the potential compensation necessary to make the
monopolist whole is only WL2. Thus, after potential
compensation, consumers would retain WL1, and the move

34. POSNER, supra note 26, at 164.
35. See generally Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules,
Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV.
1089, 1106-10 (1972) (discussing the need for liability rules).
AT WAR
36. See, e.g., ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY
WITH ITSELF 51 (1978) (discussing the goal of antitrust to "maximize consumer
welfare").
37. See Warren J. Samuels, Welfare Economics, Power and Property, in LAW
AND ECONOMICS: AN INSTITUTION PER SPEC TI^ 9, 23 (Warren J. Samuels & A.
Allan Schmid eds., 1981); see also Victor P . Goldberg, Public Choice-Property
Rights, 8 J . ECON. ISSUES 555, 556 (1974).
38. Samuels, supra note 37.
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from monopoly to competition is wealth-maximizing, or KaldorHicks efficient.
It might be objected that, if wealth maximization is the
basis of the claims of monopoly inefficiency, then private
transactions between the parties themselves should lead to the
efficient level of output. This is predicted by the famous Coase
T h e ~ r e m .In
~ ~the monopoly case, this would require that
consumers bribe the monopolist with some amount of money
(between WL2 and WL2 + WL1) to expand output from Qm to
Qc. Such a transaction is inconceivable because of the
enormous transaction costs involved in consumers collectively
undertaking to make such an offer. It follows that when
transaction costs present a barrier to private transactions,
liability rules (like the Sherman Act and the Clayton Act)
should be employed to mimic market outcomes. Viewed in this
way, antitrust policy is consistent with the law-and-economics
approach to other areas of the common law.
It is instructive to compare the above discussion of the
inefficiency resulting from monopoly with the standard
economic analysis of consumer surplus (assuming cardinal
utility). In the simple, single-good context, social efficiency is
maximized when the following condition holds:
MC = MU,
where MC is the marginal cost of producing output and MU is
the marginal utility that consumers derive from the output.40
Like the wealth-maximizing criterion, the above efficiency
condition maximizes total utility measured in willingness to
pay. Notice that, in the monopoly case, this efficiency condition
is not satisfied. Because the monopolist produces output to a
point where price is above marginal cost (while consumers
continue to purchase products to the point where prices equal
marginal utility), under monopoly MC < MU. This implies that
wealth can be increased if the monopolist were to expand
output.
Economists can also directly measure the deadweight loss
triangle by estimating the compensating and equivalent

39. Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960),
reprinted in RONALDH. COASE,THE FIRM, THE MARKET, AND THE LAW 95 (1988).
40. See WILLIAM J . BAUMOL & ALAN S. BLINDER, MICROECONOMICS:
PRINCIPLES
AND POLICY257-58 (6th ed. 1994); see also Lewis A. Kornhauser, A
Guide to the Perplexed Claims of Efficiency in the Law, 8 HOFSTRAL. REV. 591,
592-93 (1980).
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variations. Suppose that a consumer is consuming a
consumption bundle consisting of butter and margarine. The
price of butter increases and the consumer reduces her butter
consumption and increases her margarine consumption. How
much did the change hurt the consumer? In other words, how
much money would the consumer have to be paid after the
price change to be just as well off a s before the price change?
This is called the compensating variation i n income. An
alternative way to measure the same harm is to ask how much
money would have to be taken away from the consumer before
the price change in order to make her as well off as she would
be after the price change. This alternative method is called the
equivalent variation in income. In most situations the two
measures will not be the same.*' However, both of these
techniques can be used to empirically measure the utility loss
resulting from a price increase if we assume utility is measured
by willingness to pay and we can construct utility functions
that capture individual preferences. The consumer surplus
measure of utility loss is directly related to compensating
variation and equivalent ~ariation.~'As Professor Willig
demonstrate^:^ the change in consumer surplus due to a price
increase generally lies between the compensating variation and
the equivalent variation.44 Two observations can be made i n
connection with the comparison of the law-and-economics
approach to monopoly and the standard economic analysis.
First, both approaches are completely consistent regarding
WL1, and second, it is obvious that in both models the
deadweight loss resulting from monopoly is a loss of utility, not
a loss of physical goods and services.
BETWEEN
WEALTHMAXIMIZATION
AND
IV. INCONSISTENCIES
RENTSEEKING
While the deadweight loss from monopoly, WL1, is
consistent with the wealth-maximizing efficiency criterion, the
41. The two measures are only the same when utility hnctions are quasilinear.
42. The economist's approach to consumer surplus thus underscores the fact
that wealth maximizing means expanding the pie of utility measured by
willingness to pay, not by a set of physical goods and services.
43. See Robert D. Willig, Consumr's Surplus Without Apology, 66 AM. ECON.
REV.589 (1976).
44. See the appendix for an illustration of compensating and equivalent
variations.
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rent-seeking argument that treats WL2 as a cost is not
consistent. To see why, consider the types of expenditures
typically conceived of as rent seeking. Lawyers and lobbyists
usually receive the brunt of the criticism. Therefore, suppose
that a firm interested in obtaining a monopoly hires a lawyer
to undertake sham litigation (unbeknownst to the lawyer), and
that the sum of the legal fees charged is equal to WL2. Can
such a transaction be called a social cost? I do not believe it
can. The problem is that this transaction between the potential
monopolist and the lawyer is being undertaken voluntarily in
the market. It is exactly the kind of transaction that property
rules are designed to encourage. Under the wealth-maximizing
criterion, we must expect social gains, not social costs, from the
transaction.
What the wealth-maximization criterion specifically does
not allow us to do is look behind preferences or treat some
preferences differently than others, but this is precisely what
rent-seeking theories ask us to do.45 We cannot turn the
voluntary transaction between the monopolist and the lawyer
into a cost by simply stating that the purpose of the desire or
the preference on the part of the buyer of legal services was to
achieve a monopoly, even if the monopoly itself is wealthreducing. Once we begin to inquire into the purposes of
preferences, the foundations of law and economics that derive
from wealth maximization are seriously compromised. It will
no longer be sound policy to simply defend property rights that
channel disputes into the marketplace, because no longer will
all voluntary transactions be unambiguously wealthmaximizing. Instead, society will have to monitor voluntary
transactions to filter out those that are for rent-seeking
purposes. Symmetrically, it might also be prudent to ask
whether non-wealth-maximizing activities that we condemn
under the wealth-maximizing criterion might not, in fact, have
some ultimate wealth-increasing goal.46 Thus, rent-seeking

45. See ROBERTCOOTER& THOMASULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS
23 (1988)
("Economists leave to other disciplines, such as psychology and sociology, the study
of whence these preferences came. We take them a s given.") (emphasis added); see
also Goldberg, supra note 37, a t 556-57 (discussing public choice-property rights
literature that considers "individual preferences [as] the ultimate data" and "tastes
a s given exogenously").
46. I t is possible that the concept of rent seeking is best explained by a
reliance on a concept of production efficiency. Production efficiency requires that a
given level of output be produced with the least cost combination of inputs for a

RENT SEEKING AND EFFICIENCY
theories force us onto a slippery slope by asking us t o value
different preferences differently.
An alternative way to approach the problem is illustrated
in the following example. Suppose that we observe a consumer
going into a department store to purchase a pair of shoes.
However, once in the store, the consumer observes that a storm
is brewing outside. As a result, the consumer decides to buy
boots rather than shoes. In this example, we would say that
the consumer's preferences have changed, but that there is no
deadweight loss. Suppose instead that the same consumer upon
entering the store notices that shoes have gone up in price
because of a monopoly in the shoe industry, and so she decides
to purchase boots. As opposed to the first scenario, now we
would maintain that a deadweight loss has occurred. My
argument is that rent seeking is more like the first example
than the second. When people purchase locks because they
notice their neighbor's house has been burglarized, or when
they buy lawyer services because of the lure of monopoly
profits, their actions merely express a change of preferences,
not a social cost.
There are also several other reasons why modifying the
original wealth-maximizing criterion can cause difficulties. A
first issue is boundary indeterminacy. Rent seeking asks us t o
modify the wealth-maximizing criterion to assert that an
activity is inefficient if it is wealth-reducing o r if it is a means
t o achieving some other wealth-reducing activity. But why stop
there? Suppose that the lawyer in our example goes to the
store t o purchase pencils.47 This is again a voluntary
transaction which should be expected to bring social gains and
which is wealth-increasing. But what if the pencils were being
given technology. In the example above, the monopolist is producing widgets but
requires the lawyer's services to maintain the monopoly. The lawyer's services are
then analyzed as an unnecessary cost of production of widgets. But this approach
arbitrarily defines the output solely as a widget. Actually, in this example there is
joint production of widgets and lawyer's services. Labelling something as
productively efficient does not escape the problem that when the owner enters into
a voluntary exchange we assume it is utility- or wealth-maximizing even if not
profit-maximizing. The two concepts will be the same only if we correctly identify
the joint products being produced. I t is not obvious to me that production efficiency
can solve the problem. To explain that some voluntary transactions are allocatively
efficient but not productively efficient would require that we unambiguously label
some purchases purely as means to other ends and others just as ends.
47. For an example of how rent-seeking arguments have entered into the
popular culture, see Stuart Speiser & John Maher, What Are Lawyers Worth?,
A.B.A. J., March 1994, at 122.
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purchased to help the lawyer write the brief, the purpose of
which, in turn, is to aid the potential monopolist? Is the pencil
transaction also a social cost? The potential list of transactions
that could be forced under the social cost umbrella becomes
endless. At bottom, the rent-seeking exercise resolves into a
hypothetical comparison between our existing society and some
ideal.48 The ideal society is one in which all wealthmaximizing transactions have taken place. This is equivalent to
defining a market economy without transaction costs and
strategic behavior if we accept the principles of the Coase
The~rern.~'
Rent-seeking social costs are the deviations of the
actual from the ideal society. Although this is the thought
experiment that rent-seeking theories ultimately force us to
perform, it is unclear whether it is even feasible.
First, specifying a single ideal society may be impossible.
Welfare economics has yet to discover a criterion that can
distinguish between the multitude of possible Pareto-optimal
distributions, and it is well known that the wealth-maximizing
criterion cannot be used to extract a single ideal
d i ~ t r i b u t i o n .At
~ ~ least one wealth-maximizing society will
correspond to each possible initial distribution of resources.
Suppose, for example, in one such initial distribution a n
individual, X, craves power and is lucky enough to be endowed
with significant purchasing power. The society that results
after all voluntary transactions take place might include
monopoly. Monopoly could conceivably result in such a society
because X may be unwilling to accept a bribe from consumers
in the amount of WL2 + WL1 to relinquish her monopoly
because she also enjoys power and requires an even higher
payment to forego that enjoyment.51Thus, monopoly, and as a

48. In this respect, rent-seeking theories are identical in structure to Paul A.
Baran's arguments in THE POLITICAL
ECONOMY
OF GROWTH(4th ed. 1967). There,
Baran argued that third-world development is hampered by excess unproductive
labor. Unproductive labor, according to Baran, "consists of all labor resulting in the
output of goods and services the demand for which is attributable to the specific
conditions and relationships of the capitalist system." Id. at 32 (emphasis omitted).
49. See Coase, supra note 39.
50. See KENNETHJ. ARROW,SOCIALCHOICEAND INDIVIDUALVALUES(2d ed.
1963); T. de Scitovszky, A Note on Welfare Propositions in Economics, 9 REV.
ECON.STUD. 77, 79 (1941).
51. The deviation of utility maximization from profit maximization defines an
agency problem. See Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the
Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON.
305 (1976).
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corollary the expenditures necessary to obtain monopoly, might
endure even in the ideal society.
A second problem involves how to classify activities that do
not arise in the ideal society but whose effect in the actual
society is to reduce transaction costs. For example, advertising
activities that reduce search costs would not be necessary if no
transaction costs existed, yet their existence in the actual
society is explained by their effect in reducing transaction
Although such activities come into being because of
transaction costs, we would not classify them as rent-seeking.
A third problem involves how to treat institutions.
Voluntary exchanges are always made in the presence of given
state variables. For example, when it is cold I buy a coat, or
when I am sick I buy medical services. Weather and illness, I
assume, should be considered state variables in the ideal
model, but how should institutional arrangements be treated?
For example, I may purchase legal services because of the tax
laws. It remains an open question whether there exists a
criterion for determining which institutional arrangements
would be part of the ideal society in the absence of transaction
costs. Yet institutional arrangements will have a dramatic
impact on what activities do and do not take place in the ideal
s~ciety?~
It is probably clear by now that the rent-seeking thought
experiment leaves us with an unworkable standard. Even if we
avoid beginning with a n ideal standard, the actual limits of
rent-seeking costs cannot be specified. Assume that, "but for"
some wealth-reducing activity, a new technology would have
been introduced. Or consider a n entire industry that operates
profitably in the market solely as a result of externalities
generated by a wealth-reducing activity. For example, assume
that the sole reason for the gun industry is to provide weapons
to robbers on the one hand and property owners seeking to
prevent robbery on the other hand. If the Department of
Justice received a request to review a merger between the only
two remaining gun manufacturers which would surely result in
higher gun prices, should the Department prevent the merger

52. See George J. Stigler, The Economics of Information, 69 J. POL. ECON.
213 (1961); see also Tollison, supra note 6, at 582 (describing consumer lobbyists
attempting to limit monopoly as rent seeking).
53. See John J. Flynn, T h Chicken and the Egg, in F'UNDAMENTALSOF THE
ECONOMIC
ROLEOF GOVERNMENT
69 (Warren J. Sarnuels ed., 1989).
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on the grounds that it is wealth-reducing, or should the
Department allow it because it will reduce social waste?
A final problem is that rent seeking may be impossible to
identify empirically. It is virtually impossible to distinguish
between fierce competition and expenditures meant to achieve
monopoly. Typically, the kind of expenditures that achieve
monopoly are also those that either increase information to
consumers, improve product quality, or cause innovations to
occur. Some expenditures that are naturally classified as
competitively desirable may suddenly become rent-seeking
social costs if they are too effective and competitors file for
bankruptcy.54
The rent-seeking literature itself is rife with ambiguity.
The seminal paper on rent seeking in the monopoly context is
Gordon Tullock's The Welfare Cost of Tariff, Monopolies and
ThefLs5 In his paper Tullock provides several examples of
such ambiguity-each more confusing than the first. His first
example involves a tariff that will provide rents to selected
firms. The prospect of rents engenders rent-seeking behavior in
the form of hiring lobbyists. According to Tullock, these
expenditures are wasteful because "from the standpoint of
society as a whole[,] they are spent not in increasing wealth
but in attempts to transfer o r resist transfer of wealth."56

54. The only possible way to salvage rent seeking is to justify it by reference
to wealth maximization. Consider the monopoly situation again. This time consider
a hypothetical bargain struck between the consumers and the lawyer. If the
expenditure by the potential monopolist on the sham litigation brief was exactly
equal to WL2, then consumers could offer the same lawyer some amount between
WL2 and (WL2 + WL1) to abstain from producing the pleading. As a result, no
monopoly would be established and consumers would benefit even after making the
payment to the lawyer. Thus, total social wealth will have increased.
The problem is that we cannot be sure that this is always possible. Suppose
that competitors make sequential investments in order to achieve monopoly, the
monopoly rent is equal to $500, and there are five competitors. If each has an
equally likely chance of obtaining the monopoly, the expected value of the
monopoly rent is $100. Each invests $10 and counters the others' strategic moves.
There is now a $50 sunk cost. But the competitors still have an incentive to invest
$100 each, and there will at minimum be $550 in rent-seeking expenditures. Or, in
the alternative, suppose that the marginal product of a dollar is very small in
terms of increasing the possibility of winning the monopoly. Thus, for a variety of
realistic reasons, the consumers would be unable to bribe the recipients of the
expenditures. For a discussion of both over-dissipation and under-dissipation
theories, see Arye L. Hillman & Eliakim Katz, Risk-Averse Rent Seekers and the
Social Cost of Monopoly Power, 94 ECON.J. 104 (1984).
55. Tullock, supra note 9.
56. Id. at 228.
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What is unclear is the meaning Tullock gives to the term
wealth. As described above, in the microeconomic approach and
in the law-and-economics literature, wealth is a quantity of
utility measured by willingness to pay, not a set of physical
goods.57 Consider now Tullock's transaction with the lobbyist.
Individual A transfers money to lobbyist B in return for B's
lobbying services. A values the services more than the money,
while B values the money more than the services. Change
lobbying services to oranges, and we have Posner's own
example of wealth maximizing referred to above.58 Moreover,
transactions that transfer wealth make up a large portion of
the economy. Many of these transactions may also perform
important economic functions that have effects on other parts
of the productive structure. For example, the function of
financial markets is to transfer wealth, yet such markets play
critical roles in the economy's functioning.
In a second example, Tullock discusses the social costs
resulting from theft. Whereas theft should be more correctly
viewed as an involuntary transfer, Tullock analyzes theft as a
pure transfer: "The theft itself is a pure transfer, and has no
welfare cost, but the existence of theft as a potential activity
results in very substantial diversion of resources to fields
where they essentially offset each other, and produce no
positive product."59 Tullock implies in this example that
activities that do not result in a product are wasteful. If he
means to say that services are always wasteful, he is clearly a t
odds with economic theory. Moreover, the diversion of resources
because of the theft could easily result in many more physical
products in the form of locks and guns.
William Landes seems to make the same error. In
discussing expenditures aimed at achieving monopoly, he
writes, "Because these expenditures produce nothing of value,
they add t o the social cost of a mon~poly.'"~Or consider
Posner, who writes, "The costs incurred in obtaining a
monopoly have no socially valuable by- product^."^' In both of
these quotations the authors implicitly abandon wealthmaximization principles. Under wealth maximization, value is

57.
58.
59.
60.
61.

See Posner, supra note 29.
See Posner, supra note 29 and accompanying text.
Tullock, supra note 9, a t 231.
Landes, supra note 23, a t 665.
Posner, supra note 1, a t 809.
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only revealed by willingness to pay, and gains occur when
transactions are voluntary. In the expenditures Tullock, Landes
and Posner describe as aimed at achieving monopoly, this
criterion is clearly satisfied. When theft or monopoly occurs,
preferences do indeed change, but we are not entitled to
prejudge such preferences.
The rent-seeking arguments are reminiscent of the debate
concerning productive and unproductive labor that took place
in the late nineteenth century. At that time, early economists
struggled t o develop a consistent criterion by which some labor
could be classified as productive, while other labor could be
considered social waste. Unfortunately, no such criterion could
be found. As Schumpeter observed, attempts to find such a
criterion served only "to display the word-mindedness of
economists and their inability to tell a real problem from a
spurious one."62
Tullock's examples bring him dangerously close to Adam
Smith's theory of unproductive labor. Like Tullock's second
example, Smith argued that only the production of physical
goods was productive because only physical goods preserve
value.63 But later economists correctly pointed out that such a
distinction is unworkable. What is the difference between a
child-care worker who provides a service by reading a story,
and a worker who creates a paperback book that is read and
then thrown away? Additionally, Tullock asks us to distinguish
between activities that create wealth and those that transfer
wealth. How should we then characterize transportation
services such as trucking, rail service and the like? Do such
services create or transfer wealth? It was precisely these sorts
of ambiguities and paradoxes that forced the economics
profession to abandon the distinction between productive and
unproductive labor. Concerns about unproductive labor are now
only of historical intere~t.'~
Rent-seeking theories thus invite
us to reintroduce ideas long since abandoned. We should resist
the temptation.

62. JOSEPHA. SCHUMPETER,
HISTORYOF ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS631 (Elizabeth

B. Schumpeter ed., 1954).
63. ADAM SMITH,THE WEALTHOF NATIONS314 (Edwin Cannan ed., Random
House 1965) (n.p. 1776).
A HISTORYOF ECONOMIC
IDEAS 83 (1959);
64. See, e.g., ROBERTLEKACHMAN,
E.K. Hunt, The Categories of Productive and Unproductive Labor in Marxist
Economic Theory, 43 SCI. & SOC'Y303 (1979).
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The originating question of this paper was whether rentseeking arguments are compatible with the wealth-maximizing
efficiency criterion. I have suggested that, because wealth
maximization requires that we treat all voluntary transactions
as welfare-improving, and because rent seeking involves
voluntary transactions, it is inconsistent t o categorize rentseeking behavior as socially wasteful. This is contrary to what
many antitrust economists and lawyers attempt to do when
they assert that the total social cost of monopoly includes both
an inefficient deadweight-loss component (which assumes a
wealth-maximizing criterion of efficiency) and a rent-seeking
social cost. What I have not argued is that rent-seeking
arguments are either meaningless or lack intuitive
attractiveness. In fact, the central insight of rent seeking-that
certain activities are less socially desirable than others-may
have some merit. Unfortunately, rent-seeking theorists have
not offered a consistent criterion that can be used t o
distinguish socially desirable activities from socially wasteful
ones. As I point out above,65 our usual efficiency criterion
rejects all such distinctions. Accordingly, a consistent theory of
rent seeking would also have to provide a new efficiency
analysis, not simply attempt to graft together two incompatible
insights.

65. See supra text accompanying note 44.
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The following example from a popular economics
textbooks6 is helpful in illustrating the meaning of the
economic concepts of compensating and equivalent variation.
As background, we suppose that a consumer has known
preferences that satisfy the following conditions: completeness,
reflexivity and transitivity. Given these properties, we can
assign a real number to every possible consumption bundle,
such that more preferred bundles get assigned larger numbers
than the less preferred bundles. The resulting "utility" function
will reproduce the order of the consumer's preferences.
As a concrete example, we now suppose that the utility
function has the form U(X1, X2) = XI% X2% , where Xi is the
output of each of the two goods. If m is the consumer's income,
and Pi is the price of each good, the demand functions in this
example are: X1 = m/(2P1), X2 = mI(2P2). Assume that in the
pre-monopoly state the consumer faces prices (1, 1) and has
income 100. In this state, X1 = X2 = 50, and the consumer's
total utility is U = 50%50%.
Now we assume that the establishment of a monopoly in
the production of good 1 causes the price of good 1 to increase
to 2. With the initial income of m = 100, we would have X1
drop to 25 while X2 remained a t 50, causing total utility to
drop to U = 25%50%. The compensating variation is the
amount of income increase that would be needed to provide the
same utility a t the new prices that one had prior to the price
change. This needed income, called m,, can be derived from
Equation 1below:
Equation 1

From Equation 1 it follows that m, must be roughly $141, and
the compensating variation is $141 - $100 = $41. Therefore, the
consumer needs $41 of additional income to offset the price
change.
The equivalent variation is the amount of income that
would have to be taken away from the consumer a t the original
66. HAL R. VARIAN, INTERMEDIATE
MICROECONOMICS:
A MODERNAPPROACH
252 (2d ed. 1990).
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prices to reduce the utility to the same amount as would the
price changes. This also can be thought of as the maximum
amount the consumer would be willing to bribe the monopolists
not to establish the monopoly. This income amount, me, must
satisfy Equation 2:
Equation 2

From Equation 2 it follows that me must roughly equal $70,
and the equivalent variation is therefore $100 - $70 = $30.
The consumers' surplus for this example will be between
$30 and $41.~~

67. See supra text accompanying note 42; VARIAN,supra note 66, at 252.

